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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 106, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, 
Petitioner, 
- and - • 
TOWN OF NEW SCOTLAND, 
Employer. 
SEAN RYAN KIRKER, for Petitioner 
MICHAEL RICHARDSON, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On August 15, 2000, Local 106, International Union of Operating 
Engineers (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the 
Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Town of New Scotland 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they 
stipulated that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
inciuded: Ali fuii-time and regular part-time highway, parks, water 
and sewer employees. 
Excluded: Superintendents 
CASE NO. C-5019 
Case No. C-5019 2 -
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on 
December 7, 2000, at which a majority of ballots were cast against 
representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the 
eligible votersintheunitiwl'rcrcast ballotsdonot desiretobe represented for the 
purpose of collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the 
petition should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
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1 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 118, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5027 
TOWN OF FLEMING, 
Employer. 
RONALD D. HILL, for Petitioner 
DALE R. YATES, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On September 19, 2000, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local 118 (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the 
Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Town of Fleming 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they 
stipulated that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
inciuded: Motor Equipment Operators and Laborers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Case No. C-5027 page 2 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on 
December 14, 2000, at which a majority of ballots were cast against 
representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election do not indicate that a majority of 
the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots desire to be represented for the 
purpose of collective bargaining by the petitioner-, IT IS ORDERED that the 
petition should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
- Of the 4 ballots cast, 2 were for representation and 2 against 
representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM ADAMS, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
JONESVILLE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Intervenor. 
WILLIAM ADAMS, for Petitioner 
RUBERTI, GIRVIN & FERLAZZO (KRISTINE AMODEO LANCHANTIN of 
counsel), for Employer 
KEVIN P. REILLY, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On October 5, 2000, William Adams filed a timely petition for decertification of 
the United Public Service Employees Union (intervepor), the current negotiating 
representative for employees in the following unit of employees of the Jonesville Fire 
District: 
Included: Full-time station keepers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C-5037 
Case No. C-5037 page 2 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail-ballot election was held on November 27, 
2000. The results of this election do not show that a majority of the eligible employees 
in the unit who cast valid ballots desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the intervenor.-
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
<7 
Michael R. Guevas, Chairman 
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 Of the 2 ballots cast, 1 was for representation and 1 against representation. 
There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RHINEBECK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
ChargingParty, 
- a n d - CASE NO. D-0270 
RHINEBECK ASSOCIATION OF NON-INSTRUCTIONAL 
EMPLOYEES, 
Respondent. 
SHAW & PERELSON, ESQ. (JAY M. SIEGEL of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (GERARD JOHN DEWOLF of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 14, 2000, the Rhinebeck Central School District filed a charge 
alleging that the Rhinebeck Association of Non-Instructional Employees (Respondent) 
had violated Civil Service Law (CSL) §210.1, in that it caused, instigated, encouraged 
and condoned a strike against the Rhinebeck Central School District for four workdays 
from October 31 through November 3, 2000. The charge further alleged that of the 
approximately forty-three employees in the negotiating unit, forty-one of those 
employees participated in the strike. 
N Board - D-0270 -2 
i 
Respondent agreed not to interpose an answer to the charge and has, thereby, 
admitted the factual allegations of the charge. The parties have agreed to enter into a 
stipulation of settlement, which provides that: 
1. Respondent's right to have dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges 
shall be suspended for a period of six (6) months commencing January 1, 2001 and 
concluding June 30, 2001; 
2. No dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted from the salaries of the unit 
members of the Respondent association until Respondent affirms that it no longer 
asserts the right to strike against any government as required by the provisions of Civil 
Service Law §210(3)(g); 
3. Upon the Public Employment Relations Board's acceptance of the 
aforementioned penalty, the proceeding commenced by the Rhinebeck Central School 
District shall be discontinued. 
Based upon the annexed stipulation of settlement, we find that the Rhinebeck 
Association of Non-Instructional Employees violated §210.1 in that it engaged in a strike 
as charged, and we determine that the recommended penalty is a reasonable one1 and 
will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
1We take administrative notice that Respondent has not previously engaged in 
any strike activity and during the course of this strike the schools remained open and 
classes were in session. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. Respondent's right to have dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges be 
suspended for a period of six (6) months commencing January 1, 2001 and concluding 
June 30, 2001; 
2. No dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted from the salaries of the unit 
members of the Respondent association until Respondent affirms that it no longer 
asserts the right to strike against any government as required by the provisions of Civil 
Service Law §210(3)(g); 
3. The Board's counsel and/or his designee shall execute the stipulation and, 
thereafter, the proceeding commenced by the Rhinebeck Central School District shall 
be, and it hereby is, discontinued. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
./-n 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
7
 Ivlarc A. Kbbottf Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RHINEBECK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party, 
and^  
RHTNEBECK ASSOCIATION OF NON-INSTRUCTIONAL 
EMPLOYEES, 
Respondent. 
WHEREAS, by Notice and Charge dated the 14th day of November, 2000, the Rhinebeck 
Central School District (hereinafter "Charging Party") lodged a charge against the Rhinebeck 
Association of Non-Instructional Employees (hereinafter "Respondent") alleging that the Respondent 
engaged in conduct in violation of Civil Service Law §210 subd. 1 for the period of October 31,2000 
through November 3, 2000, and 
WHEREAS, the Respondent has agreed not to interpose an Answer to the Charge and 
thereby, pursuant to PERB's Rules of Procedure, admits to the factual allegations of the Charge, and 
WHEREAS, in recognition of their respective interests, the parties hereto have agreed to the 
following terms and conditions: 
IT IS ACCORDINGLY HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges of the Respondent shall be 
suspended for the period of six (6) months commencing January 1, 2001 and concluding June 30, 
2001 based upon the Respondent's actions in engaging in a strike, as charged, in violation of Civil 
STIPULATION OF 
SETTLEMENT AND 
DISCONTINUANCE 
Case No. 
D-0270 
Service Law §210 subd. 1. 
2. That no dues or agency shop fees shall be deducted from the salaries of the unit 
members of the Respondent association until the Respondent affirms that it no longer asserts the 
right to strike against any government as required by the provisions of Civil Service Law §210(3)(g). 
3. Upon the Public Employment Relations Board's acceptance of the aforementioned 
-penalty- as- being-reasonable-and-one- which effectuates the^urposeand7policy"ofthe^Pzf6/fc 
Employment Relations Act {Civil Service Law Article 14), the foregoing proceeding shall be deemed 
discontinued and settled, in all respects. 
Dated: /!>, /yo/od JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. 
Attorney for Rhinebeck Association of 
Non-Instructional Employees 
Dated: )l\\f\0 
. DeWolf, /Esq., of Counsel 
• York State Unitii Teachers 
159 Wolf Road, Box 15008 
Albany, New York 12212-5008 
(518)459-5400 
SHAW & PERELSON, ESQ. 
Attorneys for the Rhinebeck Central 
School District 
By: ILLUL 
Dated: Lf 2-J e j 
Ja/M. Siegel, E? 
2-4 Austin Court 
Poughkeepsie, New York 12603 
ROBERT A. DePAULA 
Deputy Chairman and Counsel 
Public Employment Relations Board 
By: 
-Gary Johnson, Esq., of Counser-
80 Wolf Road, 5th Floor 
Albany, New York 12205 
5373/33739/CWA1.141 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DORR GLOVER, 
Charging Party, 
and CASENO.U-21162 
VILLAGE OF BELMONT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 317, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
DORR GLOVER, pro se 
JAECKLE, FIEISCHMANN & MUGEL, LLP (SEAN P. BEITER of counsel), for 
Respondent 
JAMES E. AUGST, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Village of Belmont (Village) to 
a decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which found a violation of §§209-
a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) on a charge filed by 
Dorr Glover alleging that the Village violated the Act when it unilaterally changed 
employees'terms and conditions of employment during the pendency of a 
representation petition. 
. Board - U-21162 -2 
Facts 
Based upon the stipulated record before us, we adopt the ALJ's findings of fact. 
We will confine our review to the salient facts relevant to the exceptions filed by the 
Village. 
After an exchange of correspondence between the ALJ 
the ALJ attempted to obtain from the parties a stipulation, of the facts, the Teamsters, by 
letter dated April 5, 2000, submitted a proposed stipulation consisting of thirty-six 
paragraphs. By letter dated April 17, 2000, the Village responded by indicating the 
• paragraphs to which it agreed. 
By letter dated April 28, 2000, the ALJ provided the parties with a stipulation 
') constructed from the agreed-upon facts. The ALJ provided the parties with several 
opportunities to review the stipulation and respond to her. Having received no 
response from the parties, on June 16, 2000, the ALJ sent a letter requesting briefs on 
or before July 14, 2000. By letter dated June 25, 2000, the Village informed the ALJ 
that it could not provide a brief because there remained "major issues of fact" requiring 
a hearing. 
The ALJ responded on July 5, 2000, directing the Village to file with her by July 
21, 2000, a statement which described the so-called "major issues of fact" believed to 
be in dispute and relevant to a decision in the matter. The Village never submitted the 
requested statement. On July 25, 2000, the ALJ advised the parties that the record 
was closed and the matter would be decided on the stipulated record. 
; 
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ALJ Decision 
The ALJ found that the Village violated §§209-a. 1 (a) and (c) of the Act when it • 
unilaterally implemented wage adjustments during the pendency of the certification 
petition. 
- . - - - Exceptions ....-- .-.. , : 
The Village excepted to the ALJ's decision on the law. The Village argues that 
the ALJ erred by closing the record without holding a hearing on the so-called "major 
issues of fact", thus depriving the Village of its right to appear and defend its position. 
Discussion 
Our procedure for the conduct of conferences and hearings is found in Part 212 
of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). Section 212.4(a) notes that "[a] formal hearing . . . 
shall be conducted as necessary by the administrative law judge . . . •:" (emphasis 
added) • 
We have addressed the ALJ's authority vis-a-vis Part 212 of our Rules and 
determined that ,;an ALJ has the discretion while processing an improper practice 
charge, either at a pre-hearing conference, after the conference, during the hearing or 
at any other appropriate juncture, to require a party to submit an offer of proof in 
support of the allegations being processed."1 
^Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 580 and Cent. New York Reg'l Transp. Auth., 
32 PERB 1J3053, at 3125 (1999). See also State of New York (DCS) 29 PERB P015 
(1996) (affirming the dismissal of a charge where the charging party failed to offer 
evidence in support of his allegations that the State acted out of anti-union animus); 
Nanuet Union Free Sch. Dist And Nanuet Teachers Ass'n, 17 PERB j[3005 (1984) 
(affirming the dismissal of a charge where the hearing officer [ALJ] requested an offer 
of proof at the close of the charging party's case before deciding the respondent's 
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The ALJ requested that the Village provide her with a statement [offer of proof] of 
the so-called "major issues of fact" so that she could determine whether a formal 
hearing was necessary under our Rules. The Village failed to respond. The Village's 
failure to object to this request or to provide this information compels the conclusion 
thatthere were no "major issues of fact" necessitating a hearing.2 .__._ : 
The Village also argues that the ALJ erred in finding that a "compensation 
system" was in place in the Village, and that there was insufficient evidence to find that 
the Village altered "the method used to calculate wage increase." 
: The stipulated facts found in the April 28, 2000 letter from the ALJ set forth' at •• 
1[17 the Village's admitted understanding of the wage issue: 
[Ejffective June 1, 1999, the Village unilaterally implemented wage 
adjustments during the pendency of the certification petition. The 
method used to calculate wages is vastly different now that the 
employees have elected to organize. Since 1992 through 1998, 
average wage increases for those sought to be organized had been 
about 5.5% across the board. In 1999, one employee received 
16.6%, one employee received 10.0%, one employee received 5.5%, 
and one employee received 2.0%. 
We have consistently found a violation of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act whenever the 
employer changes the status quo of terms and conditions of employment during the 
pendency of a representation petition.3 The Village elected to stipulate to the content of 
1J17 as set forth in the ALJ's letter. It is clear from fi17 that the Village unilaterally 
motion to dismiss.) 
2See County of Chautauqua, 21 PERB 1J3057, at 3123 (1988). 
3See Genesee-Livingston-Steuben-Wyoming BOCES, 29 PERB ff3065 (1996). 
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implemented wage adjustments during the pendency of the representation petition 
which were vastly different from the past and, as a result, the Village changed the 
status quo. The effect of such a change is inescapable. We have found that 
[s]uch changes in employment conditions inherently chill employees 
in their protected right to seek representation . . . [and, thus] [t]o give 
. anyemployer-thelegal rightlto make changes in the employment, 
conditions of its employees during the pendency of a representation 
question and prior to the certification of a bargaining agent would 
afford that employer an unfair advantage in any negotiations 
subsequently required.4 
Lastly, the Village argues that the ALJ erred in directing a remedy which required 
the Village to make employees whole for any wages or benefits lost by reason of the 
Village's unilateral wage adjustments. In City of Albany v. Helsby, the Court of Appeals 
recognized PERB's authority to fashion a remedy under the Act.5 The Village contests 
the ALJ's remedy because the record is not clear how previous increases factored into 
the 5.5% average. This argument lacks merit .because the manner in which the Village 
calculated previous wage increases is not material to our assessment of a violation.6 
We have previously held that a make-whole order is not rendered impossible to perform 
when the record reflects any basis on which such a remedy can be made.7 
4Genesee-Livingston-Steuben-Wyoming BOCES, supra note 3 at 3151. 
529 NY2d 433, 5 PERB 1J7000 (1972). 
6See State of New York-Unified Court Sys., 33 PERB P043 (2000). 
7See City of Troy, 29 PERB 1J3004 (1996); V7//age of Buchanan, 22 PERB 1J3001 
(1989); City of Rochester, 21 PERB P040 (1980); confirmed, 155 AD2d 1003, 22 
PERB 1J7035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
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Based on the foregoing, the Village's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Village of Belmont: 
1. Forthwith restore the method used to calculate wage increases 
which was in effect on January'19, 1999, when theipetition fox 
certification was filed by the Teamsters; 
2. Make employees whole for any wages or benefits lost by reason 
of the change in the compensation system on June 1, 1999, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate;8 and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily 
used to post notices of information to employees in the unit 
represented by the Teamsters. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
. ^ L 
Michael/R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Ma^ rc K. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
8While it is appropriate to restore the parties to positions in which they would 
have been but for the statutory violation, recoupment of wages paid to employees in 
excess of the 5.5% wage system would be an unusual remedy causing some hardship 
to affected bargaining unit members and is not ordered here. While recoupment has 
been found to be appropriate in some cases, it is a.remedy resorted to only under 
unusual circumstances, which are not here present. See Brookhaven-Comsewogue 
Union Free Sch. Dist, 22 PERB P037, at 3087 (1989). 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORKLSTATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Village of Belmont (Village) in the unit represented by 
Teamsters, Local 317, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO (Teamsters) that the 
Village will: 
1. Forthwith restore the method used to calculate wage increases which was in effect 
on January 19,1999, when the petition for certification was filed by the Teamsters. 
) 2. Make employees whole for any wages or benefits lost by reason of the change in 
the compensation system on June 1, 1999, with interest at the maximum legal 
rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Village of Belmont 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting; and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RANDOLPH D. DRAKES, 
Charging Party, 
and- CASE NO. U-21826 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Respondent, 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK (BANKING DEPARTMENT), 
Employer. 
RANDOLPH D. DRAKES, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Randolph D. Drakes to a decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that the Public Employees Federation 
(PEF) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in its 
handling of a grievance he had filed against his employer, the State of New York 
(Banking Department) (State).1 
"•Section 209-a.3 of the Act makes the public employer a statutory party to certain 
charges filed under §209-a.2(c). 
Board - U-21826 -2 
FACTS 
On July 12, 2000, Rudolph D. Drakes filed an improper practice charge against 
PEF. By letter dated July 17, 2000, the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) advised Drakes that his charge was 
deficient because "[he] must provide specific facts relating to each act The 
general conclusions [he] set forth do not establish arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith 
conduct by PEF." 
By letter dated September 4, 2000, Drakes submitted a sworn statement 
amending his original charge. 
In response to Drakes' letter of September 4, 2000, the Assistant Director 
advised him that his amendment was also deficient. He wrote: 
Because an improper practice charge must be filed within four 
months of the conduct at issue, your charge is timely filed only as 
to the exchange of correspondence in June 2000. 
The difference of opinion between yourself and PEF as to the need, 
for more relevant information does not establish that its request for 
same is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
Moreover, the facts pled do not evidence that PEF's withdrawal of 
your grievance meets the above standards. 
Drakes submitted an unsworn reply, by letter dated September 11, 2000, to the 
Assistant Director's letter and, following this correspondence, the Director dismissed the 
charge on September 25, 2000. Based upon our review of the record and 
consideration of Drakes' arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Board - U-21826 -3 
EXCEPTIONS 
Drakes excepted on the grounds that the Director erred in applying the law to the 
facts. 
DISCUSSION 
On October 26, 2000, Drakes was granted an extension to file exceptions in this 
matter with the caveat that "[his] exceptions [would be] deemed timely if filed and 
served on or before November 6, 2000. Please refer to PERB's Rules of Procedure 
with regard to service and filing." Subsequently, on November 13, 2000, PERB's 
Deputy Chairman and Counsel sent courtesy copies of the exceptions to the 
Respondents because it appeared that Drakes had failed to serve them. In its 
response to the exceptions, PEF requested dismissal of the exceptions on the ground 
that Drakes did not comply with §213.2 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). That section 
of the Rules requires that a copy of the exceptions be served upon all parties at the 
same time as the exceptions are filed and that proof of such service be filed with us. 
Drakes failed to comply with this Rule.2 
We have consistently applied the service requirements of our Rules strictly when 
a party to a proceeding raises an objection to a failure of service, as timely service is a 
component of timely filing.3 Consequently, Drake's failure to serve the exceptions in 
2Although PEF and the State received a courtesy copy of the exceptions from 
the Board's Deputy Chairman and Counsel, this does not satisfy the service 
requirements under our Rules nor cure the service defect. 
3See County of Washington, 32 PERB 1J3033 (1999); City of Watervliet, 30 
PERB U3024 (1997); Yonkers City Sch. Dist, 30 PERB 1J3026 (1997); Catskill Regional 
Off-Track Betting Corp., 14 PERB 1J3075 (1981) (subsequent history omitted). 
Board - U-21826 
accordance with the Rules requires dismissal of the exceptions pursuant to PEF's 
motion. Under these circumstances, we do not reach the merits of the exceptions. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions must be, and hereby are, 
dismissed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: Eebruary 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
- ^ ^ ^ ^ £ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ X-. 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ M&rc A. Abbott, Member * ^ 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOEL FREDERICSON, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
JOEL FREDERICSON, prose 
) MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (EDWARD F. 
ZAGAJESKI of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Joel Fredericson to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge alleging, as 
amended, that the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) violated §§209-a.1 (a) and 
(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by filing disciplinary charges 
against him in retaliation for his exercise of protected rights. 
FACTS 
The original charge, filed March 30, 1999, alleged, inter alia, that Fredericson 
was an elected Vice-Chairperson and Safety Committee Member of the Track Division 
CASE NO. U-20779 
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of Local 100, Transport Workers Union of America (Local 100). On December 2, 1998, 
he received an arbitration decision which resulted in his employer, NYCTA, imposing 
the penalty of a warning allegedly in retaliation for engaging in protected activity, to wit: 
union representation and attendance at union functions during the period of June 27, 
1996 to July 17, 1996, 
Subsequently, on October 4, 1998, NYCTA allegedly retaliated against 
Fredericson by serving him with Disciplinary Action Notification (DAN) #98-2877-0006 
for submitting a leave request for union business. On December 23, 1998, NYCTA 
served him with a DAN allegedly in retaliation for his attendance as a witness at an 
arbitration hearing involving his Chairperson, Roger Toussaint. On January 25, 1999, 
NYCTA's Superintendent allegedly discriminated against Fredericson by refusing his 
request to participate in Toussaint's hearing. On February 17, 1999, NYCTA again 
allegedly discriminated against Fredericson by denying his request to participate in 
Toussaint's grievance hearing. 
On May 12, 1999, Fredericson amended his charge, by including two other 
instances where NYCTA allegedly discriminated against him because of his union 
activities. He alleged that, on April 30, 1999, NYCTA retaliated against him by issuing 
DAN #99-2801 -0067 seeking his termination. On May 11,1999, at an arbitration 
hearing on DAN #98-2877-0006 and DAN #98-2877-0007, previously issued to him, 
Local 100's attorney and recording secretary made a request for an adjournment, which 
Board - U-20779 -3 
was granted. Allegedly, in retaliation for this adjournment, NYCTA counsel directed that 
Fredericson surrender his NYCTA pass and was told that he was "out of service". 
In answer to the charge, NYCTA raised, among other things, the timeliness of 
the charges and that the allegations were the subject of pending contractual disciplinary 
matters over which PERB has no jurisdiction. 
During the processing of the improper practice charge, Fredericson, together 
with Local 100's counsel, entered into a stipulation settling the DAN's, except the 
allegation referring to the 1996 matters. 
Following the execution of the settlement stipulation, NYCTA moved to dismiss 
the improper practice charge, as amended, because the settlement stipulation resolved 
the disciplinary grievances brought by Fredericson and waived Fredericson's right to 
pursue his improper practice charge. In addition, NYCTA alleged that the charge with 
respect to the 1996 incidents was untimely. The ALJ found that the allegations relating 
to the incidents that occurred in 1996 were untimely, but found that the charge as it 
relates to the most recent incidents in 1998 and 1999 was timely brought. 
Notwithstanding the timeliness of the charge, the ALJ found that the stipulation that 
settled the grievances also waived Fredericson's right to pursue his improper practice 
charge. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
Fredericson's exceptions are founded on his assertion that the ALJ made an 
error of law. 
DISCUSSION 
We have determined that a charging party bears the burden of presenting the 
facts in support of an improper practice charge. Thus, a charge will be dismissed if a 
charging party has not sustained his/her burden of proof.1 No further hearings need be 
held where the evidence presented by the charging party does not set forth a prima 
facie case.2 
We have held that with respect to "a motion made to [an ALJ] to dismiss a 
charge after the presentation of the charging party's evidence . . . [w]e would reverse 
[an ALJ's] decision to grant such a motion unless we could conclude that the evidence 
produced by the charging party, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, is plainly 
insufficient even in the absence of any rebuttal. . . ."3 
The questions here presented are whether Fredericson's charge as to the 1996 
incidents is timely and whether he has waived his right to pursue his improper practice 
charge as to the other allegations by executing the settlement stipulation of the DAN's. 
'Whitesboro Cent. Sch. Dist, 14 PERB 1J3039 (1981). 
2County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB P013 (1984). 
3/d., at 3029-30. 
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As the ALJ correctly pointed out, §204.1 (a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) requires that an improper practice charge be filed within four months of the date 
of the conduct which is the subject of the charge. Furthermore, the Rules do not 
provide for any extension of time to file an improper practice charge.4 We have also 
determined that the filing period is not tolled while ancillary proceedings (grievance 
arbitration) are being pursued by or on behalf of a charging party, even when those 
proceedings have the potential to effectively moot the improper practice alleged.5 
The original charge, filed March 30, 1999, alleged violations that occurred in 
1996, and on October 4, 1998, December 23, 1998, January 25, 1999 and February 
17, 1999. The amended charge included incidents which occurred on April 30, 1999 
and May 11, 1999. The ALJ correctly found that to be timely, the charge must allege 
incidents that occurred on or after November 30, 1998. Here, the allegations relating to 
the 1996 incidents, even though not disposed of by way of arbitration until December 2, 
1998, were untimely. In addition, the ALJ correctly dismissed as untimely the 
4See Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100, 33 PERB P013 (2000); 
Public Employees Fed'n (Mankowski), 33 PERB fl3032 (2000). For other cases 
discussing attempts to toll the four-month limitation of time, see New York City Transit 
Auth. and Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (Dye), 30 PERB 1J3032 (1997) 
(allegations of misconduct of Transit Authority more than four months after disciplinary 
hearing); State of New York (GOER), 22 PERB 1J3009 (1989) (four-month limitation in 
Rules runs from the date the adverse action took place and not from the date when 
improper motivation is ascribed to it); Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of 
New York, 19 PERB fl3066 (1986) (exhaustion of administrative review proceedings). 
i 
5See Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (Hokai), 32 PERB ^3019 (1999); 
Orange County Correction Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 28 PERB p 0 8 1 (1995). 
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allegations relating to the two incidents of October 4, 1998 resulting in DAN #98-2877-
0006 and DAN #98-2877-0007. As to the remaining allegations, the ALJ found the 
charge timely. We agree, as those events fell within the four months preceding the 
filing of the improper practice charge and its amendment. 
NYCIA also argued in support olits motion to dismiss Eredericsonls charge that 
he has waived his right to pursue his improper practice charge based, as amended, 
upon the executed stipulation of settlement. The ALJ agreed and found that the 
stipulation effectively waived Fredericson's right to prosecute the remaining timely 
allegations in the improper practice charge. In support of her decision, she relied upon 
a prior case involving NYCTA and the application of the same language found in a 
grievance settlement where an ALJ held this language to be an effective waiver.6 We 
agree. 
In reaching our decision to affirm the ALJ's decision, we have reviewed the 
three-prong waiver test in light of the facts of this case.7 As to the first two prongs of 
the test, the facts are uncontroverted that Fredericson's charge is founded upon the 
DANs he received and, secondly, our prior decisions have held that a party may waive 
6
 New York City Transit Auth. (Diaz), 31 PERB 1J4566 (1998). 
7Such a waiver analysis requires a three-prong inquiry: whether the language of 
the waiver covers the improper practice charge, whether the waiver is Unenforceable as 
against public policy and whether the waiver was clear and knowing. See New York 
City Transit Auth., 27 PERB fl3060 (1994); CSEA v. Newman, 88 AD2d 685, 15 PERB 
H7011 (3d Dep't 1982), appeal dismissed, 51 NY2d 775, 15 PERB 1J7020 (1982). 
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his/her right to file an improper practice charge.8 It is the third prong that is of interest to 
us: Was this waiver clear, unmistakable and without ambiguity?9 
By the terms of the stipulation of settlement, "[g]rievant, [Fredericson] and the 
union jointly and severally . . . release the Transit Authority from any and all claims, 
whether at law, in equity or arising by virtue of contract in connection with the 
underlying disputes in case(s) number(s) 98-2802-0227; 98-2877-0006; 98-2877-0007; 
99-2801 -0067." We previously held in Board of Education of the City School District of 
the City of Buffalo™ that broad language such as this constituted a knowing and 
intentional waiver of the right to file a charge. 
The stipulation, in addition to the foregoing broad language, withdraws the 
i disciplinary grievance appeals "with prejudice". In return, Fredericson received a 
modified disciplinary penalty. Fredericson, with the assistance of his counsel, 
knowingly entered into the stipulation.11 
Looking at the facts most favorable to Fredericson, it is inescapable that, by his 
execution of the stipulation of settlement, he has waived his right to pursue his claims 
8Board ofEduc. of the CitySch. Dist. of the City of Buffalo, 22 PERB 1J3047 
(1989) and the cases cited therein. 
9CSEA v. Newman, supra note 7; Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist, 21 PERB fl3021 
(1980). 
™Supra note 8. 
11The ALJ notes in her decision that "[t]he same attorney who represented 
Fredericson in the grievance arbitrations and settlement served as counsel for the 
) charging party in NYCTA (Diaz)." 33 PERB 1J4621, at 4267 n. 8. 
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before PERB.12 Therefore, we deny Fredericson's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
12Fredericson alleged in his exceptions that the settlement stipulation was 
coerced. This issue was not raised before the ALJ and is, therefore, not before us for 
review. See Commack Teachers Ass'n, 19 PERB fl3011 (1986), confirmed sub nom. 
Margolin v. Newman, 130 AD2d 312, 20 PERB 1J7018 (3d Dep't 1987). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Kenjaev Jouidach to a decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge. The 
original charge, sworn to April 23, 2000 and amended May 6, 2000, alleged, inter alia, 
) 
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that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 237, AFL-CIO (IBT), violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by not responding to 
his request to challenge his discharge from employment with the New York City 
Technical College of the City University of New York (CUNY). 
On September 20, 2000, the ALJ dismissed the charge when Jouldach failed to 
appear at the hearing scheduled for that date and/or communicate to the ALJ his 
excuse for not attending the hearing. 
Section 212.4(b) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) provides: 
The hearing will not be adjourned unless good and 
sufficient grounds are established by the requesting party* 
who shall file with the administrative law judge an original 
) • • and three copies of the application, on notice to all other 
' parties, setting forth the factual circumstances of the 
application and the previously ascertained position of the 
other parties to the application. The failure of a party to 
appear at the hearing may, in the discretion of the 
administrative law judge, constitute ground for dismissal of 
the absent party's pleading. 
On July 18, 2000, the ALJ sent the notice of hearing for September 20, 2000 to 
all parties. The notice advised Jouldach that: 
Failure to appear at the hearing may constitute ground for 
dismissal of the absent party's pleading. Any request for an 
adjournment must be made in writing, reasonably in advance, 
indicating the basis therefor and the position of each party thereon. 
On September 20, 2000, counsel for IBT and for CUNY appeared for the 
hearing. The ALJ postponed the commencement of the hearing in order to give 
Jouldach an opportunity to appear or communicate with the ALJ. The ALJ attempted to 
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call Jouldach at the telephone number listed on his pleading but without success. After 
waiting one hour past the scheduled hearing time, and not having received any 
communication from Jouldach, the ALJ dismissed his charge. 
Jouldach argues in his exceptions that he did not receive any notification of the 
hearing date, nor was he contacted on the day of the hearing in spite of being home 
that day. 
A review of the record demonstrates that the notice of hearing was mailed to the 
address Jouidach listed on his charge. His telephone number appeared on the charge 
and the ALJ used that number to call him on the day of the hearing. Counsel for the 
other parties received the same.notice and appeared on the hearing date. The notice 
sent to Jouldach was not returned by the post office. 
We have previously held that an unexcused failure to appear at a scheduled 
PERB proceeding constitutes a failure to prosecute a charge which is grounds for 
dismissal.1 Since Jouldach did not provide to the ALJ, and has not provided to us in his 
exceptions, any evidence that would excuse his absence from the hearing, we deny 
Jouldach's exceptions and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
1See Smithtown Fire Dist, 28 PERB |f3060 (1995); Board ofEduc. of the City 
Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 16 PERB 1J3067 (1983). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
(y\yi^yCA/U^C *~~£ ^—-C^-^-«-=. 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
]/\Aixzjk. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Bellmore Union Free School 
District (District) to a decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper 
practice charge, as amended, filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Bellmore School Unit, Nassau Educational Local 865 
(CSEA). CSEA alleges that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when, contrary to established practice, it paid a newly hired 
teaching assistant a higher salary than that provided for at the first step of the salary 
schedule set forth in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 
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FACTS 
The ALJ's findings of fact are extensive and detailed. We, therefore, adopt them 
for the purposes of our decision and summarize them, as here relevant, as follows. 
CSEA represents "all teaching assistants and non-teaching personnel in 
Employee's Unit No. 11T including all-non-teaching school nurses^sGhoolaides^part 
time bus drivers, part-time bus matrons, and part-time cafeteria aides."1' 
The District posted a position opening, as well as advertised for applicants, for 
the position of teaching assistant. The successful candidate was to be assigned to the 
technology program. Aside from the required certification as a teaching assistant 
(six college credits in the appropriate areas), the posted notice did not require any 
special technology courses, training or certification. Salary was to be in accordance 
with the CSEA contract.2' 
On November 16, 1999, the District hired Marie Miccio to fi!l this position; Miccio 
was a new employee to the District. Richard Daddio, the District's Assistant 
Superintendent for Business and Technology, testified that he hired Miccio at step three 
of the salary schedule in recognition of her prior teaching experience and her private '• 
sector experience in the area of technology. 
Both CSEA and the District introduced evidence regarding the District's hiring of 
teaching assistants since 1981. CSEA's evidence pointed to other teaching assistants 
17Joint Exhibit 1, Collective Bargaining Agreement (July 1, 1996-June 30, 1999) 
-Joint Exhibit 2, Position Opening 
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hired at step one, even with prior teaching experience. The District's evidence showed 
ten employees hired at a higher step since 1981. Since 1997, only one teaching 
assistant was hired at a step higher than step one and that was because she had been 
employed by the District and would have been paid a lower salary than she was making 
: as a school monitor^unless she was hired at step two, :- — 
Two other employees who were not teaching assistants were hired at a step 
higher than step one during that time frame. One, a school nurse, was a former District 
employee who had been excessed. She was rehired at the salary step she had 
previously received. The other employee, a maintainer, was given credit for prior 
experience.-
\ After a review of all the testimony, documents and arguments, the ALJ found a 
violation. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepted to the ALJ's decision on the grounds that the ALJ erred in 
law and misinterpreted the facts in reaching her decision. The District argues that the 
ALJ erred by finding that, because the management rights clause does not address the 
issue of salary, the District violated §209-a.1 (d). Secondly, the District argues that the 
teaching assistant's position in question was a new position and, therefore, the District 
is entitled to establish a starting salary. Thirdly, the District argues that the ALJ erred in 
-Seven employees hired between 1981 and 1997 were hired at a step higher than step 
one. None of them were teaching assistants. Two were former District employees who 
were placed on the same step they had held previously. 
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finding that CSEA demonstrated the existence of a past practice of hiring all teaching 
assistants at step one of the salary schedule. Next, the District argues that the ALJ 
erred in rejecting the District's position that the past practice should be evaluated on a 
unit-wide basis. Lastly, the District contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting the District's 
argumentin equity.i.e.it; would-be inequitable to findforCSEA becauseJt would hav^a 
serious and deleterious impact on the District's ability to hire qualified individuals. 
DISCUSSION 
The charge before us alleges that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by 
refusing to negotiate in good faith with CSEA by hiring a teaching assistant at a starting 
salary step higher than the first salary step contained in the collective bargaining 
\ agreement contrary to established practice. 
The ALJ found that the District's change in its past practice of hiring teaching 
Assistants at the first step of the contractual salary schedule was a violation of the Act. 
However reluctantly, we are compelled to disagree and reverse the ALJ's decision and 
order. 
It is undisputed that the parties'collective bargaining agreement does not specify 
a hiring rate or salary step for newly hired employees.- The parties have each 
submitted evidence to support their respective positions that the District either did or did 
not have a past practice of hiring new employees at the first step of the salary schedule 
contained in the collective bargaining agreement. 
, -The District raised the issue that the management rights clause (Article XVIII) of the 
parties' contract provided it with the defense of waiver or duty satisfaction. 
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i 
It is axiomatic that wages and salaries, or starting salaries of titles in the 
bargaining unit for that matter, are the most basic of terms and conditions of 
employment and, therefore mandatory subjects of negotiation.- The change in a 
practice involving wages and salaries, without negotiations, would give rise to a failure 
to bargain charge. Such a failure4o bargain charge can be defended by proof that 
either: (1) the parties have satisfied their statutory obligation to bargain over the at-
issue subject,- or (2) the charging party has waived its' right to bargain over the 
subject." 
Indeed, the District first argues that its bargaining obligation has been satisfied 
as evidenced by the management rights clause of the collective bargaining agreement. 
"\ We disagree. As the ALJ correctly noted, Article XVIII cannot reasonably be interpreted 
as dealing with the issue before us.- The right to make hiring decisions and to deploy 
personnel are generally considered management prerogatives and are separate and 
distinct issues from salary, wages or starting salaries, and, therefore, cannot serve as a 
5/Act, §201.4. See Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist, 14 PERB ^[4625 (1981), aff'd, 15 
PERB 1J3025 (1982). See also County of Livingston, 30 PERB fi3046 (1997); Town of 
Greece, 28 PERB ff3078 (1995); State of New York-UCS, 26 PERB 1J3013 (1991). 
51
 County of Nassau, 31 PERB 1f3074 (1998). 
7JCSEA v. Newman, 88 AD2d 685, 15 PERB 1J7011 (3d Dep't 1982), affd, 61 NY2d 
1001, 17 PERB H7007 (1984). 
-The language of the management rights clause deals with the Districts ability to "hire 
and assign personnel." 
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basis for a waiver or duty satisfaction defense.- We have previously found that a broad, 
nonspecific management rights clause did not support a contractual waiver defense.— 
The management rights clause asserted here is such a broad, nonspecific clause. The 
District's first exception is, therefore, rejected. 
The District next argues that since ithad created a new^position,^Teaching 
Assistant - Technology", it was entitled to set the salary for the position regardless of 
any salary schedule contained in the contract. The record does not support the 
District's contention. The announcement of the position at issue describes it as 
"Teaching Assistant" ( a position that is within the CSEA bargaining unit) and the 
qualifications required were not changed from prior announcements for teaching 
assistant vacancies. If, as the District argues, it was difficult to fill the position at the 
salary level indicated for teaching assistants, other lawful procedures could have been 
followed to have the position upgraded."' The argument of necessity, to the extent that 
it can be deemed a separate District argument, is rejected for the same reason. 
S/See Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist of the City of New York, 22 PERB p 0 1 1 
(1989); Churchville-Chili Cent. Sch. Dist, 17 PERB P055 (1984). 
^'Onondaga-Madison BOCES, 13 PERB ff3015 (1980), confirmed, 82 AD2d 691, 14 
PERB fl7025 (3d Dep't 1981). 
^'Compare County of Monroe, 29 PERB f3060 (1996), confirmed sub nom., CSEA v. 
PERB, 248 AD2d 882, 31 PERB fl7007 (3d Dep't 1998) and Rye City Sch. Dist, 33 
PERB fl3053 (2000), where the District employed teacher assistants assigned as 
computer laboratory assistants. These computer laboratory assistants were 
represented by CSEA. The District, following civil service procedures, reclassified the 
computer laboratory assistants to computer aide. This enabled the District to place the 
computer aide into the appropriate bargaining unit at the appropriate salary scale. 
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Finally, the District argues that CSEA failed to meet its burden of proof to 
establish a past District practice of hiring new employees at the first step of the salary 
scale when the history of unit-wide hiring is considered. CSEA, in turn, argues that it did 
meet its burden, contending that only the hiring practices concerning teaching 
assistants is relevantThe AUJ rejected4he-District-s argumentand agreed with CSEA-
that the past practice test is title specific. We disagree. 
A past practice must be unequivocal and have been in existence for a significant 
period of time such that the employees in the unit could reasonably expect the practice 
to continue without change.— A past practice will generally be viewed as a practice 
that affects the unit as a whole. While CSEA argues that the District's hiring practice as 
relevant to this case is title-specific, there is no evidence in the record to compel us to 
take such a circumscribed view.15'' Since this is an issue of unit-wide concern, we find, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the test as to whether the District had 
established a practice as to this term should be tested on a unit-wide basis. 
The ALJ correctly stated the elements of proof necessary to establish the 
existence of a practice which the employer cannot unilaterally change. However, we 
take this opportunity to order them differently. The first test is whether the charge 
^County of Nassau, 24 PERB 1J3029 (1991). See also City of Rochester, 21 PERB 
1J3040 (1988), confirmed, 155 AD2d 1003, 22 PERB fl7035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
^'See County of Essex, 31 PERB 1T3026 (1998). 
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concerns a mandatory subject.— If not, our analysis need go no further as the 
employer would not then be required to bargain and no charge could be sustained.— 
Here, we are dealing with a mandatory subject so our analysis must continue. 
We, therefore, must test whether the charging party has demonstrated an unequivocal 
practice that Gontinued-uninterruptedfora significant period of time^such that the 
employees could reasonably expect the practice to continue unchanged.— The District 
asserts, and CSEA does not dispute, that out of sixty-two new hires, the District hired 
seven individuals in titles in this bargaining unit since 1986 at salary steps other than 
the first step. CSEA would have us limit our consideration to the District's twelve-year 
history in hiring teaching assistants. We cannot say that either view of the District's 
history would establish an unequivocal, clear and unambiguous practice that new 
employees are always placed on the first step of the salary schedule. At best, the 
District's practice with respect to new-hires is susceptible to two equally reasonable and 
diametrically opposed conclusions: one supporting a step-one hiring practice and the 
other not. Therefore, CSEA must be considered to have failed in meeting its burden of; 
proof.— 
M/See City of Syracuse, 31 PERB ^3025 (1998). See also County of Nassau, 32 PERB 
113034(1999). 
^' See, e.g., State of New York, 31 PERB P018 (1998). 
—'County of Nassau, supra note 12. 
—'County of Essex, supra note 13. 
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Nor do we feel that we can discount those individuals hired into bargaining unit 
positions for the first time with other experience with the District. There is no contract 
basis for hiring anyone with District or non-District experience at any particular salary 
step. CSEA cannot, on the one hand, argue against Miccio's hiring on a higher step 
despite her prior experience in another District and^on the otherrarguethaMhey should 
not be penalized for allowing others to be hired above step one based on their 
experience in the District. To do so would be to create an artificial distinction. It would 
allow the District to engage in direct dealing with new hires with prior District experience 
but not with other new hires. 
At the outset of this discussion, we noted our reluctance to reach the conclusion 
we feel the law compels us to reach. The issue of starting salary is a fundamental one 
that the parties should address through collective negotiations. That an employer could 
choose to hire new employees at different salary steps without negotiated standards 
violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Act. Had this case come to us as a failure to 
bargain upon demand, a different result would likely have been reached.— It.is, 
therefore, our hope and expectation that the parties will deal with this issue through 
collective negotiations in the immediate future. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the District's exceptions and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. 
— See City of Syracuse, supra note 14. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
IvWc A^ . Xbbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 7 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Southampton (Town) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Town violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused to calculate 
and pay a daily rate of pay to employees in a unit represented by the Police Benevolent 
Association of Southampton Town, Inc. (PBA), in accordance with the terms of an 
expired interest arbitration award which covered the period of January 1,1995 through 
December 31, 1996. The improper practice charge was filed by the PBA. 
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FACTS 
The Town and the PBA were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which 
expired on January 31, 1994. The parties attempted to negotiate a successor 
agreement, but their negotiations resulted in a declaration of impasse filed by the PBA. 
The parties then proceeded to interest arbitration.Jnhe arbitration panel made certain 
findings as to the items in dispute between the parties and also, at the parties' request, 
agreed to incorporate into the award a list of items agreed to by the parties, including 
the following item, which is the subject of this improper practice charge: 
Overtime: Effective upon the issuance of this Award 
employees [sic] hourly and daily rate of pay shall be 
calculated incorporating longevity pay, night differential pay 
and holiday pay earned the previous calendar year. 
Upon receipt of the draft of the award, labor counsel for the Town advised the 
panel that the above language was in error, contending that the PBA's proposal upon 
which the overtime provision was based had sought only to change the calculations for 
the hourly rate of pay in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and not 
the daily rate of pay. The PBA disagreed with the Town's assertion and the arbitration 
award was issued on October 21, 1996, including the above language, with the panel's 
chair noting that it was the language submitted by the parties in the document setting 
forth the items they had agreed upon and he was powerless to change the language. 
The term of the arbitration award was January 1, 1995 through December 31, 1996. 
The Town thereafter implemented the award as to the hourly rates of pay but not 
as to the calculation of the daily rate of pay. The Association filed a grievance dated 
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January 22, 1997, alleging that the Town had failed to comply with the stipulation 
incorporated into the parties' 1995-1996 interest arbitration award. The Town denied 
the grievance and the PBA thereafter filed a demand for arbitration on May 5, 1997. 
The parties then stipulated that the issue to be decided was whether the Town violated 
the^interest arbitration award by failing to include amounts earned for night differential, 
longevity, and holiday pay in calculating the daily rate of pay for sick days and holidays. 
The PBA also moved to confirm the interest arbitration award, which resulted in 
another stipulation between the parties that the interest arbitration award would be 
confirmed with the exception of the overtime clause, which would be interpreted by the 
grievance arbitrator. An order was entered in Supreme Court, Suffolk County, on 
December 3, 1997, granting the PBA's motion. 
On June 16, 1997, the parties entered into a memorandum of understanding for 
a collective bargaining agreement for the term January 1, 1997 through December 31, 
2000. The memorandum reflected the parties' agreement that the provisions of the 
memorandum and the uncontested portions of the prior collective bargaining agreement 
would be incorporated into a new collective bargaining agreement. The parties at the 
time did not finalize the collective bargaining agreement. Further, they did not discuss 
whether the decision of the arbitrator on the PBA's grievance would be incorporated 
into the new collective bargaining agreement. 
The PBA's grievance was decided by the arbitrator on January 2, 1999. The 
arbitrator found that the Town had violated the interest arbitration award by failing to 
include amounts earned for night differential, longevity and holiday pay in calculating 
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the daily rate of pay for holidays but not for sick days. The award required the Town to 
do the calculations and, within sixty days, to pay the PBA unit members at the correct 
rate, retroactive to January 22, 1997. The Town did not pay the amount awarded. The 
Association requested, by letter dated May 4, 1999, that the Town honor the award. By 
letter-dated May-14,1999, theJTown advised the PBA that it would notpay. The PBA 
then moved in Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to confirm the grievance arbitrator's 
award. The PBA's motion was granted by Supreme Court on October 12, 1999. In 
confirming the grievance arbitration award, the court noted that the award concerned 
only the period of the interest arbitration award, January 1, 1995 through December 31, 
1996. The effect of the award on the status quo was left by the Court to be determined 
by PERB. 
THE ALJ'S DECISION 
Initially, the ALJ found that PERB had jurisdiction because the PBA was not 
seeking to enforce the terms of either the interest arbitration or grievance arbitration 
awards, allegations which would be beyond PERB's jurisdiction.1 The charge alleged 
that the Town violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by failing to continue the status quo, as 
established by the terms of the interest arbitration award and defined in the grievance 
arbitration award, an allegation over which the ALJ found this Board has jurisdiction. 
1Act, §205.5(d). 
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The ALJ also found that the charge was timely, having been filed within four 
months of when the PBA was advised by the Town that it would not calculate the daily 
rate as set forth in the interest arbitration award, as defined by the grievance arbitration 
award. Finally, the ALJ found that the Town had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by 
failing to continue the sifafws quo of calculating the daily rate^as required by the^expired 
interest arbitration award. The ALJ relied upon the decision of another ALJ in Town of 
Blooming Grove (hereafter, Blooming Grove)2, where it was held that an employer 
violates §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by failing to continue the terms of an expired interest 
arbitration award. The ALJ there determined that the status quo after the expiration of 
an arbitration award is defined by the terms of the expired award and the expired 
collective bargaining agreement, if the terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
have not been superseded by the award. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Town excepts to the ALJ's determination that PERB has jurisdiction over the 
charge, that the terms of an interest arbitration award can define the status quo and 
that the Town had an obligation to provide a benefit for which it was not liable during 
the term of the interest arbitration award. 
DISCUSSION 
The issue presented to us by this case is one of first impression. We are asked 
to decide whether the terms of an interest arbitration award can set the status quo 
233 PERB 1T4581 (2000). 
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between the parties until a new collective bargaining agreement is negotiated. We find 
that it can. 
The decision of the ALJ in Blooming Grove was well reasoned and we adopt the 
rationale and conclusions therein. Briefly, the ALJ relied on an early Board decision in 
Massapequa Union Free School District, which found that after a legislative hearing 
resulting in a legislative imposition, the legislative imposition's terms constituted the 
status quo which an employer is obligated to continue until the parties negotiate a new 
agreement.4 The ALJ in Blooming Grove determined that the same rationale should 
apply to interest arbitration awards. The ALJ relied upon our decisions in City of 
Kingston5 and City of Buffalo6 for the rationale that an employee organization may rely 
on the protections of §209-a.1 (e) to continue the terms of an expired agreement when 
no new agreement has been reached or may participate in the impasse procedures in 
§209 of the Act to resolve the collective bargaining impasse. Having chosen to 
participate in the impasse procedures, an employee organization may not seek the 
continuation of the terms of an expired collective bargaining agreement that have been 
superseded by the interest arbitration award. While noting that legislative imposition 
and interest arbitration are different procedures, the ALJ reasoned that both result in 
the resolution of an impasse in negotiations and both are part of the statutory scheme. 
38PERB H3022(1975). 
4See Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., 5 PERB 1J3037 (1972). 
518PERB H3036(1985). 
619 PERB 1J3023 (1986). 
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While the legislative determination is imposed by the public employer's legislative body 
and the interest arbitration award is determined by a three-member arbitration panel, 
only one of whom is a representative of the public employer, both procedures take into 
account the public employer's financial ability to pay. 
The Act intended to bring about harmonious and cooperative relations between 
public employers and employee organizations, by effecting stability in the employment 
relationship and finality in bargaining. As the ALJ in Blooming Grove noted: 
Reversion to the expired contract's terms at the expiration of 
an award, the terms of which had replaced the contractual 
terms, is inconsistent with this policy: it would institute the 
status quo ante, not the status quo; penalize the unions for 
obtaining impasse resolution and thereby undermine the 
Act's intended bargaining finality....7 
We have long held that terms and conditions of employment, whether contained 
in an expired collective bargaining agreement or existing as a result of a past practice 
between the parties, must be continued until a new agreement is negotiated.8 
Having determined that the status quo may be defined by the terms of an 
interest arbitration award leads us to the second question raised by this case: what is 
the status quo with respect to the daily rate of pay? 
We find that the status quo is set forth in the terms of the interest arbitration 
award, as construed by the grievance arbitration award and confirmed by Supreme 
Court, Suffolk County. The interest arbitration panel, the grievance arbitrator and the 
7Supra note 2, at 4711. 
8See, Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., supra note 4. . 
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court have all determined that the parties agreed to recalculate hourly overtime pay and 
daily holiday pay by incorporating into base pay amounts earned for night differential, 
longevity and holiday pay earned the previous calendar year. The interest arbitration 
award was for the period of January 1, 1995 through December 31, 1996. It defined the 
terms and-conditions of employment between the parties unless and until the terms are 
varied by a subsequent collective bargaining agreement or interest arbitration award. 
That it took until October 12, 1999 for the at-issue terms of the interest arbitration award 
to be given definition does not alter the status quo. Neither does the fact that the Town 
has not complied with the terms of the interest arbitration award. 
The Town argues that the PBA must prove that a term and condition of 
employment actually existed before it can prove a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act. It 
is the Town's position that the obligation to calculate the daily rate using the 
components contained in the interest arbitration award never existed because the 
award expired effective December 31, 1996, well before the grievance arbitrator's 
decision finding that the Town was violating the interest arbitration award by failing to 
include amounts earned for night differential, longevity and holiday pay in calculating 
the daily rate. We disagree. The Town's failure to comply with an interest arbitration 
award for over four years does not provide a basis for our finding that the status quo is 
noncompliance with the terms of the interest arbitration award. To do so would . 
encourage parties to ignore the terms of an interest arbitration award. Whiie the Town 
may have had no obligation to comply with the disputed terms of the interest arbitration 
award while the grievance as to the terms' meaning was pending, once the grievance 
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arbitrator issued his award and it was confirmed by Supreme Court, the Town's 
obligation was fixed until such time as the parties negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement which varies the terms of the interest arbitration award or another interest 
arbitration award is issued. 
Wefurther-reject the Town's argument that requiring it to comply with the terms 
of the interest arbitration award extends the award beyond the two-year limit set by the 
Legislature. We are not extending the award, we are simply finding that the terms and 
conditions of employment set forth in the award define the status quo until the parties 
negotiate a new agreement. Upon the negotiation of a new collective bargaining 
agreement, to the extent the agreement changes the terms and conditions of 
employment set forth in the award, the collective bargaining agreement will set the 
status quo. 
We, therefore, find that the Town violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by failing to 
continue the status quo, as set forth in the 1995-1996 interest arbitration award and 
defined by the 1999 grievance arbitration award, in the calculation of the daily rate by 
including amounts earned for night differential, longevity and holiday pay. 
Based on the foregoing, the Town's exceptions are denied and the decision of 
the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town of Southampton 
1. Cease and desist from failing to include the amounts 
earned for night differential, longevity and holiday pay 
in calculating the daily rate of pay for holidays, 
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2. Make employees in the unit represented by the PBA 
whole for any monetary loss sustained as a result of 
the failure of the Town to make payments in 
accordance with the method of calculation set forth in 
paragraph 1, since December 31,1996, with interest 
at the maximum legal rate. 
Sign and post the attached notice at al locations 
normally used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
i ^ - * -
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
N EW YO RK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Southampton (Town) in the unit represented by the Police 
Benevolent Association of Southampton Town, Inc. (PBA) that the Town will forthwith: 
1. Include the amounts earned for night differential, longevity and holiday pay in 
calculating the daily rate of pay for holidays. 
2. Make employees in the unit represented by the PBA whole for any monetary loss 
sustained as a result of the failure of the Town to make payments in accordance 
) with the method of calculation set forth in paragraph 1, since December 31,1996, 
with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By . . . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARTIN FREEDMAN, 
Charging Party^ 
- and - CASE NO. U-20764 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
MARTIN FREEDMAN, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD A. SHANE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
DALE C. KUTZBACH, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (ANGEL L. ORTIZ 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION AND ORDER 
The charging party, Martin Freedman, has moved this Board to reconsider our 
decision and order previously issued on January 24, 2000.1 The respondent has 
opposed the motion. 
133 PERB 1J3004 (2000). 
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Having reviewed the moving papers, we determine that there is neither such 
newly discovered material or overlooked propositions of law to justify reconsideration of 
our Decision and Order, issued over one year ago, on January 24, 2000. 
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is denied.2 
DATED: February 2, 2001 :. 
Albany, New York 
-«£. 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
7 
^ r c K. Abbott, lumber 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
2See Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist, 25 PERB 1J3027 (1992); New York City 
Transit Auth., 24 PERB 1J3030 (1992); Capital Dist. Reg'l. Off-Track Betting Corp., 20 
PERB H3026(1987). 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 693, 
Petitioner, 
-and- ' . • CASE NO. C-5038 
TOWN OF TOMPKINS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters, Local 693, has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances, 
x Included: All MEOs and HEOs. 
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Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Teamsters, Local 693. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligationJo meet at:reasonable times and confeun good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
VlarcA.y\b&6tt, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5039 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 264, International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time and regular part-time Dlspatchers/Reservationists, 
Relief Dispatchers/Reservationist and Dispatchers/Schedulers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 264, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
M. / " MarcAr Abbott, Member 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
u 
n 
* i 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ICHABOD CRANE REGISTERED NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
—Petitionee, •— 
-and- CASE NO. C-4880 
ICHABOD CRANE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ICHABOD CRANE 
CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT CSEA UNIT, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Ichabod Crane Registered Nurses 
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Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time registered nurses. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Ichabod Crane Registered Nurses Association. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 2, 2001 
Albany, New York j 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
